Having done startups in the national security space (and had to deal with clearances) -- it's a bad system from both directions -- overly onerous compliance for good people AND ineffective at addressing modern security risks. It made sense in the 1950s as a way to protect large development and operational programs with long tenure employment against penetration by an external adversary (USSR), and to a limited extent, ideological or financially motivated defectors. It doesn't work as well today where someone can become "radicalized" online, foreign/international contacts are routine, etc.
Just being a citizenship bar, even if it did nothing else, really complicates hiring in tech -- what you often end up doing is having as much work as possible done uncleared/commercially and then thrown over the wall to cleared people who can implement it with the client. Works well in infosec with mostly systems integrated with commercial stuff; doesn't work with jet engines or missiles as well
Clearances being handed out like relative candy to 18-28 year olds in the military (so, for someone like Manning, approximately zero information responsive to requests (as minor records excluded, and the 7-10 year lookback isn't relevant when you have far fewer adult years), extreme reluctance to suspend or revoke a clearance when granted), and ineffective reporting of incidents.
The hassle of holding a clearance to some extent depends on the issuing agency/level (DOD Secret is relatively non-hassle; law enforcement ones are more lifestyle focused on paper at lower levels; substantial travel restrictions for levels/programs come in above Secret too).
There is also the difference between official restrictions and reality -- given OPM hack and general government incompetence, it's safe to assume your info becomes public or at least known to adversaries, so even after a clearance expires, it would probably be unwise to travel to some countries for a much longer period. Also exposes your family/other contacts to hassle from both USG investigators and potential foreign adversaries.
Just being a citizenship bar, even if it did nothing else, really complicates hiring in tech -- what you often end up doing is having as much work as possible done uncleared/commercially and then thrown over the wall to cleared people who can implement it with the client. Works well in infosec with mostly systems integrated with commercial stuff; doesn't work with jet engines or missiles as well
Clearances being handed out like relative candy to 18-28 year olds in the military (so, for someone like Manning, approximately zero information responsive to requests (as minor records excluded, and the 7-10 year lookback isn't relevant when you have far fewer adult years), extreme reluctance to suspend or revoke a clearance when granted), and ineffective reporting of incidents.
The hassle of holding a clearance to some extent depends on the issuing agency/level (DOD Secret is relatively non-hassle; law enforcement ones are more lifestyle focused on paper at lower levels; substantial travel restrictions for levels/programs come in above Secret too).
There is also the difference between official restrictions and reality -- given OPM hack and general government incompetence, it's safe to assume your info becomes public or at least known to adversaries, so even after a clearance expires, it would probably be unwise to travel to some countries for a much longer period. Also exposes your family/other contacts to hassle from both USG investigators and potential foreign adversaries.