Isn’t this the exact problem tree-based broadcast encryption schemes were designed to solve? You could surgically revoke the keys of a bad actor, and I’m not exactly sure, but I think the scope of their ability to affect the jamming resistance of other users is necessarily limited by the tree.
I would think you could, in principle, deduce the bad key from a recorded segment of the jamming signal, and only revoke when identified.
I would have to look at the math more specifically, but I would think it would be impossible to both disguise the compromised key and take advantage of the key to interfere with the signal in the way its designed to prevent. And even if you did, I’m fairly sure the jamming would only affect users whose decryption runs through your branch, and in your geographic proximity so I don’t think it would have an advantage of countering the below the noise floor decryption designed to mitigate against jamming.
